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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE
PART Ill
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
This is the third in a series of articles examining
the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal
cases.

RULE 501: PRIVILEGES
Rule 501 is the only provision governing the law
of privilege in the Rules of Evidence. Rule 501
does not create any privileges; instead, it provides
that the law of privilege is governed by statute
enacted by the General Assembly and by the common law. Consequently, the Rules of Evidence do
not change the Ohio law of privilege. Although not
specifically enumerated in Rule 501, constitutionally-based privileges also apply in Ohio trials.
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964) (5th Amendment applicable in state trials); Ohio Canst., art. I,
§ 10.
RULE 601: COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES
Rule 601 provides that "[e)very person is a competent witness." There are five exceptions to this
general provision, three of which are important in
criminal cases.
Persons of Unsound Mind
Rule 601(A) provides that persons of unsound
mind who appear incapable of receiving or relating
impressions are incompetent. This provision is
based on RC 2317.01. The Staff Note employs the
term "insane persons" in describing this rule. This
description is misleading. The tests for insanity
and competency are not the same. In State v.
Wildman, 145 OS 379, 61 NE(2d) 790 (1945), the
Supreme Court commented:
Under the trend of modern decisions the fact that a
witness is insane does not necessarily exclude him
from the witness stand ....
Ordinarily the presumption is that persons who are
called as witnesses are competent ... , but this pre-

sumption may be overcome by a proper showing. According to the general rule, the question of competency lies in the sound discretion of the trial judge,
and, if he permits a witness of unsound mind to
testify, his action in so doing is not a ground of reversal at the behest of an aggreived party, unless there
is an abuse of discretion ....
A person who is able to correctly state matters
which have come within his perception, with respect
to the issues involved, and appreciates and understands the nature and obligation of an oath is a competent witness notwithstanding some unsoundness of
mind. /d. at 385-86.

Children Under Ten Years of Age
Rule 601 (A) provides that children under ten
years of age who appear incapable of receiving or
relating impressions are incompetent. This provision is based on RC 2317.01.
If the witness' capacity to perceive is in issue, it
is the age at the time of the transaction about
which the witness testifies that is controlling and
not the age at the time of trial. In Huprich v. Paul
W. Varga & Sons, Inc., 3 OS(2d) 87, 209 NE(2d) 390
(1965), the Court held: "Where a witness is over ten
years of age when he testifies but was under ten
at the time of the happenings about which he proposes to testify, the capability of such witness to
receive 'just impressions' of such happenings
must nece_ssarily be determined as of the time of
those hapenings." /d. (syllabus, para. 1). The court
went on to state that "it was the duty of the trial
court to determine, after examination, the competency of the proffered witness ... [B]oth counsel
are entitled to present relevant evidence subject to
the control of the trial court as to the mental capacity of the witness to observe accurately and
recollect, including expert witnesses and testimony." /d. at 90-91. Accord, City of Berea v.
Petcher, 119 App 165, 188 NE(2d) 605 (1963) (court
must hold hearing on competency of child under
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ten years of age).

personal knowledge or evidence admitted at the
trial or proceeding. A lay witness also may give an
opinion, but Rule 701 requires such opinions be
based on firsthand knowledge.
In Cleveland, Terminal and Valley R. Co. v.
Marsh, 63 OS 236, 58 NE 821 (1900), the Court explained the firsthand knowledge requirement as
follows:
It is error to allow a witness to testify, over the objection of the other side, as to the identity of a person,
without first qualifying himself by showing he has
some knowledge on the subject. (syllabus, para. 1)
A witness should testify in accordance with the
knowledge he has at the time of testifying, and is not
confined to the knowledge he may have had at a
previous time. (syllabus para. 2)
Because it is often difficult to distinguish between what a witness knows and what a witness
thinks he knows, Rule 602 alters the trial judge's
traditional function in applying the firsthand
knowledge rule. The trial judge does not decide
whether or not a witness has firsthand knowledge,
but only whether sufficient evidence to support a
finding of firsthand knowledge has been introduced. If sufficient evidence has been adduced,
the witness may testify and the jury decides
whether or not the witness had firsthand
knowledge.

Spouses in Criminal Cases
Rule 601(B) provides that a witness-spouse is incompetent to testify against a defendant-spouse in
a criminal case unless the charged offense involves a crime against the testifying spouse or the
children of either spouse. This testimonial
privilege or disqualification must be distinguished
from the privilege relating to confidential communications between spouses. The confidential
communication privilege is recognized in RC
2317.02(C) and RC 2945.42, and is governed by
Rule 501.
On January 14, 1981 the Supreme Court promulgated an amendment to Rule 601. See 54 Ohio Bar
175 (1981). The amendment abolishes the testimonial spousal privilege in criminal cases. If not
disapproved by the General Assembly, the amendment becomes effective on July 1, 1981. See Ohio
Canst., art. IV, § 5(8).
Law Enforcements Officers in Traffic Cases
Rule 601(C) provides that a law enforcement officer is incompetent as a witness if (1) on duty exclusively or for the "main purpose" of enforcing
traffic laws, (2) arrests or assists in the arrest of a
misdemeanor offender, and (3) is not in a properly
marked vehicle or legally distinctive uniform as
prescribed by statute. This provision is based upon
RC 4549.14 and RC 4549.16. The term "traffic
laws" includes municipal ordinances. City of
Dayton v. Adams, 9 OS(2d) 89, 223 NE(2d) 822
(1967). Adams involved the use of radar. Although
the "chase vehicle" was properly marked, the vehicle in which the radar unit was located was not
properly marked. The Court held the officer in the
radar car was not competent under the statute.
Whether the arresting officer's "main purpose"
involved enforcing traffic laws has been the subject of several decisions. In City of Columbus v.
Stump, 41 App(2d) 81, 322 NE(2d) 348 (1974), the
court upheld the competency of an arresting officer who was not in a distinctively marked vehicle
and who was working undercover at the time of
the arrest:
"Main purpose" must involve the complete assignment of duty for the ... police officer for the "trick"
he worked as a whole. If that assignment included
narcotics control efforts and the patrolling of the city
for protection against the many forms of law breaking, then it cannot be said that traffic control was the
"main purpose" of his assignment that night .... The
entire duty of the officer, be multiple or single, must
be respected and to do otherwise flies in the face of
the intent of the legislature ... /d. at 84-85.
See also State v. Thobe, 91 Ohio LAbs 92, 191 NE(2d)
182 (Ct App 1961); State v. Maxwell, 60 Misc.1,395
NE(2d) 531 (Mun Ct 1978).

'RULE 603: OATH OR AFFIRMATION
Rule 603 requires witnesses to swear or affirm
to the truthfulness of their testimony prior to testifying. Several constitutional and statutory provisions also cover.the subject of oaths. Ohio Constitution, article I,§ 7 provides: "No religious test
shall be required, as a qualification for office, nor
shall any person be incompetent to be a witness
on account of his religious belief; but nothing
herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths
and affirmation." See also RC 2317.30; RC 3.20; RC
3.21.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule
603 contains the following comment: "The rule is
designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, atheists, conscientious
objectors, mental defectives, and children. Affirmation is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the
truth; no special verbal formula is required." Failure to administer an oath over objection was held
reversible error in State v. Ballou, 21 App(2d) 59,
254 NE(2d) 697 (1969): "We hold that to adduce evidence through one not under oath ... over objection in a criminal case constitutes error prejudicial
to the defendant." /d. at 61.
RULE 604: INTERPRETERS
Rule 604 governs the use of interpreters. In
effect, an interpreter is a type of expert witness.
Consequently, the rule provides that interpreters
are subject to the "rules relating to qualification
as an expert." Sef:! Rule 702. Rule 604 also provides that an interpreter is subject to the oath or
affirmation requirement. See Rule 603. Unlike other

RULE 602: LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
Rule 602 codifies the firsthand knowledge rule.
The rule is subject to Rule 703 which specifies the
bases for expert opinion testimony. Under that provision an expert may base his opinion on either
2
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witnesses, however, an interpreter does not swear
or affirm thai he will testify truthfully, but rather
that he will translate accurately.
The rule does not control the appointment of interpreters or their compensation. The appointment
and compensation of interpreters is governed by
statute. For example, RC 2311.14(A) provides:
"Whenever because of a hearing, speech or other
impairment a party to or witness in a legal proceeding cannot readily understand or communicate, the court shall appoint a qualified interpreter
to assist such person."
Severaf cases have recognized a constitutional
right to an interpreter in criminal cases, including
the appointment of an interpreter for an indigent
defendant. For example, in United States v.
Carrion, 488 F(2d) 12 (1st Cir 1973), cert. denied,
416 US 907 (1974), the court stated:

is a witness in the case."
Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments
Rule 606(8) governs the impeachment of verdicts
and indictments. Under the rule a juror is not competent to testify about the internal operations or
thought-processes of the jurors during the course
of deliberations. The federal drafters provided the
following explanation of the types of evidence that
would be excluded under the rule:
[T]he central focus has been upon insulation of the
manner in which the jury reached its verdict, and this
protection extends to each of the components of
deliberation, including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, and any
other feature of the process. Thus testimony or affidavits of jurors have been held incompetent to show a
compromise verdict, ... ; a quotient verdict ... ; speculation as to insurance coverage ... ; misinterpretation
of instructions ... ; mistake in returning the verdict ... ;
interpretation of guilty plea by one defendant as implicating others ... Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 606.

Clearly, the right to confront witnesses would be
meaningless if the accused could not understand
their testimony, and the effectiveness of crossexamination would be severely hampered .... If the
defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, but has
an imperfect command of English, there exists the
additional danger that he will either misunderstand
crucial questions or that the jury will misconstrue
crucial responses. The right to an interpreter rests
most fundamentally, however, on the notion that no
defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an
incomprehensible ritual which may terminate in
punishment. /d. at 14.

\()

A juror, however, is competent to testify about
extraneous prejudicial information that has been
introduced into the jury deliberation process. In
addition, a juror is competent to testify about outside influences that have been improperly brought
to bear on the deliberation process. "Thus, a juror
is recognized as competent to testify to statements by the bailiff or the introduction of a prejudicial newspaper account into the jury room ... "
Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 606.
Unlike the federal rule, however, extrinsic evidence of extraneous information or influence must
first be introduced before a juror is permitted to
testify about such matters. This has been described as the aliunde rule. In State v. Adams, 141
OS 423, 48 NE(2d) 861 (1943), the Supreme Court
explained the rule as follows: "The so-called
aliunde rule ... is to the effect that the verdict of a
jury may not be impeached by the evidence of a
member of the jury unless foundation for the introduction of such evidence is first laid by competent
evidence aliunde, i.e., by evidence from some other
source." !d. at 427. Rule 606(8) recognizes one exception to aliunde rule. The rule does not apply in
cases in which threats, bribes, attempted threats,
attempted bribes, or other improprieties involve an
officer of the court. This exception is based upon
State v. Adams, 141 OS 423, 48 NE(2d) 861 (1943),
and Emmert v. State, 127 OS 235, 187 NE 862
(1933), which involved communications to the jury
by bailiffs.

RULE 605: COMPETENCY OF JUDGE AS WITNESS

Rule 605 provides that a judge is incompetent as
a witness at a trial at which he is presiding. No objection is required to preserve the issue for appeal.
The rule should be invoked only in a rare case. If
the trial judge knows in advance of trial that he
may be a witness, the judge should recuse himself
prior to trial. See Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 3(C)(1). Moreover, testifying as a witness in
a case in which the judge is presiding should re~-· quire disqualification. In State v. Barber, 100
App(2d) 71, 121 NE(2d) 438 (1954), the court stated,
"The very nature of the judicial office ... preclude
one who is a material witness in a case from sitting as an impartial judge." /d. at 73. See also
McMillan v. Andrews, 10 OS 112 (1859).

""

RULE 606: COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS

During Trial
Rule 606(A) prohibits a juror from testifying in a
case in which that juror is serving as a member of
the jury. An opportunity to object to the compe. tency of a juror on this ground must be provided
outside the presence of the jury. Rule 606(A)
should be invoked only in a rare case because a
person called as a juror may be challenged for
~ cause if he has been "subpoenaed in good faith as
a witness in the case." Grim. R. 24(8)(8); see also
RC 2945.25(G). In addition, RC 2945.36(C) provides
that a jury may be discharged without prejudice to
the prosecution in a criminal case if "it appears
the jury has been sworn that one of the jurors

RULE 607: WHO MAY IMPEACH

Rule 607 permits a party to impeach his own witnesses, thus abolishing the Ohio voucher rule. See
State v. Adams, 62 OS(2d) 151, 157, 404 NE(2d) 144,
148 (1980).
Unlike Federal Rule 607, the Ohio rule imposes a
Hmitation on the impeachment of a party's own
witness by means of a prior inconsistent statement. In such a ·case, impeachment is permitted
3

only upon a showing of surprise and affirmative
damage. This limitation was intended to prevent
the circumvention of the hearsay rule. Except as
provided in Rule 801(D)(1)(a), prior inconsistent
statements constitute hearsay evidence, and thus
are admissible only for the purpose of impeachment. Without the surprise and affirmative damage
requirements, a party could call a witness for the
sole purpose of disclosing the prior inconsistent
statement (hearsay) to the jury. An instruction
limiting the use of the statement to impeachment
probably would be ineffective. See Staff Note
("Otherwise, the party would be entitled to call a
known adverse witness simply for the purpose of
getting a prior inconsistent statement into evidence by way of impeachment, thus doing indirectly what he could not have done directly.")
The Ohio rule was taken verbatim from an article
by Professor Michael Graham. Graham, Employing
Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as
Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1565,
1617 (1977). This article provides guidance on how
Rule 607 should be applied. In particular, Professor
Graham notes: "The requirement of surprise may
be inappropriate in criminal cases where impeachment is by the criminal defendant: it could impede
the defendant's right to confront the witnesses, to
present a defense, and to produce witnesses on
his own behalf." /d. at 1617.
The Ohio cases have recognized that when a
party is "surprised" by the testimony of his own
witness, that party may question the witness about
a prior inconsistent statement in an effort to
refresh the witness's recollection. See State v.
Dick, 27 OS(2d) 162, 271 NE(2d) 797 (1971); State v.
Minneker, 27 OS(2d) 155, 271 NE(2d) 821 (1971);
State v. Springer, 165 OS 182, 134 NE(2d) 150
(1956).

waste of time, and confusion, and to make the lot
of the witness somewhat less unattractive." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608. This
aspect of Rule 608 is consistent with prior Ohio
law. In State v. Scott, 61 OS(2d) 155, 400 NE(2d) 375
(1980), the Supreme Court held: "In impeaching the
credibility of a witness, inquiry into general reputation or character should be restricted to reputation
for truth and veracity." (syllabus, para 3) (emphasis
in original). Accord, Craig v. State, 5 OS 605 (1854).
A foundation showing that the character witness
is acquainted with the reputation of the principal
witness must be laid before the character witness
is permitted to state his opinion of that reputation.
The Supreme Court described this foundational requirement in Radke v. State, 107 OS 399, 140 NE
586 (1923):
[T]he impeaching witness must show on preliminary
examination either that he has for some time lived in
that community or done business in that community,
or some other relation to that community that would
qualify him to speak as to the community's general
opinion touching the reputation of the party sought to
be impeached. The preliminary qualifications of the
impeaching witness must be such as to advise the
court and the jury that he has the means of knowing
such general reputation of the witness sought to be
impeached in the community in which the witness
lives. /d. (syllabus, para. 1)

Rule 608(A) also provides that once a witness'
character for truth and veracity has been attacked,
opinion and reputation evidence showing that the
witness has a good character for truth and veracity
is admissible. The principal issue in applying this
rule is determining what types of impeachment
constitute attacks on character. The federal
drafters provided the following guidance: "Opinion
or reputation that the witness is untruthful specifically qualifies as an attack under the rule~ and evidence of misconduct, including conviction of
crime, and of corruption also fall within this category. Evidence of bias or interest does not." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 608. See Wick
& Co. v. Baldwin, 51 OS 51, 36 NE 671 (1894)
(evidence of good character for truthfulness after
witness impeached with evidence of prior conviction admitted).
Specific Instances of Conduct
Rule 608(B) provides that a witness on crossexamination may be asked, subject to the trial
court's discretion, about specific instances of con·
duct if clearly probative of the witness' character
for truthfulness. Extrinsic evidence of conduct,
however, is inadmissible. Specific instances of
conduct that have resulted in a conviction are governed by Rule 609, not Rule 608.
As the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 608 indicates, the trial court's decision to
admit such evidence is governed generally by Rule
403. "[T]he overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or
misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars harassment and undue embarrassment." In this con-

RULE 608: EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND
CONDUCT OF WITNESS

Opinion and Reputation Evidence
Rule 608(A) permits the use of opinion and reputation evidence to show a witness' character for
untruthfulness. This type of impeachment is an exception to the general prohibition of the use of
character evidence. See Rule 404(A)(3). Because
the rule is limited to impeachment, it applies only
after the witness whose character is subject to
attack has testified. In this context, character is
used circumstantially; a person with a poor
character for truth and veracity is more likely to
testify untruthfully than a person with a good
character for truth and veracity. See also Rule
803(20) (recognizing a hearsay exception for
reputation evidence concerning character).
The rule limits the type of evidence that may be
used to impeach to the character trait of untruthfulness. See Staff Note ("only evidence relating to
veracity is admissible."). This limitation is imposed
in order "to sharpen relevancy, to reduce surprise,
4
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text, however, Rule 403 must be read in light of
Rule 608. Only evidence relevant to truth and veracity is admissible. In addition, unlike Rule 403,
Rule 608 requires the evidence to be "clearly" probative. The word "clearly" does not appear in the
federal version of Rule 608, although it did appear
in the revised draft of the Federal Rules. See 51
F.R.D. 389 (1971). The word "clearly" was inserted
in the Ohio rule in order to "require a high degree
of probative value of instances of prior conduct as
to truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness ... "
Staff Note.

impeachment. Convictions falling into this category are automatically admissible; the trial judge has
no discretion to exclude these convictions. The
principal issue in applying this rule is determining
what types of crimes involve "dishonesty" and
"false statement." The Conference Report contains the following comment: "By the phrase 'dishonesty and false statement' the conference
means crimes such as perjury or subornation of
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the
nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or
falsification bearing on the accused's propensity
to testify truthfully." H.R. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Gong.
2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Gong. & Ad.
News 7098, 7103. Although theft offenses typically
are thought of as involving dishonesty, it is uncertain whether they are admissible under this provision in light of the legislative history of the rule.
See 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence
336-42 (1979); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~609[03] (1978).

RULE 609: EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Rule 609 governs the admissibility of evidence
of prior convictions offered for the purpose of
impeachment.
Types of Convictions
Rule 609(A) limits the types of convictions that
are admissible for the purpose of impeachment to
convictions of (1) crimes punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year and (2) crimes
of dishonesty and false statement, including ordinance violations. These limitations were not recognized under prior Ohio law. See RC 2945.42. In
State v. Murdock, 172 OS 221, 174 NE(2d) 543
(1961), the Supreme Court interpreted RC 2945.42
as permitting the admission in evidence of all prior
convictions, including misdemeanors. The court
also held, however, that an ordinance violation
was not a "crime" within the meaning of the
statute. See State v. Arrington, 42 OS(2d) 114, 326
NE(2d) 667 (1975); Harper v. State, 106 OS 481, 140
N E 364 (1922).
The rule differs from Federal Rule 609(A)(1) in
one important respect. The federal rule contains
an additional requirement. Prior convictions falling
within this category are admissible only if the
"court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant." Thus, a federal judge has
discretion to exclude the evidence even if the prior
conviction involves a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year.
In contrast, Rule 609(A) would appear to provide
that convictions falling within this category are
automatically admissible. Nevertheless, the Staff
Note includes language that indicates that a trial
court retains discretion to exclude prior convictions that fall within this category. The Staff Note,
after referring to the discretion recognized in the
federal rule, states: "In limiting that discretionary
grant, Rule 609(A) is directed to greater uniformity
in application subject only to the provisions of
Rule 403. The removal of the reference to the
defendant insures that the application of the rule
is not limited to criminal prosecutions." This
Passage suggests that the drafters were not concerned with eliminating discretion but rather were
concerned with its uniform application.
Rule 609(A)(2) provides that evidence of prior
convictions involving crimes of dishonesty and
false statement is admissible for the purpose of

Time limit
Rule 609(B) provides that evidence of a prior
conviction that satisfies the criteria of Rule 609(A)
is nevertheless inadmissible if more than ten years
has elapsed since the date of (1) conviction, (2)
release from confinement, or (3) termination of probation, shock probation, parole, or shock parole,
"whichever is the later date." The rule does
recognize an exception. Such convictions may be
admissible if the proponent provides sufficient advance written notice to the adverse party and the
court determines, based upon "specific facts and
circumstances," that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. See Annat., 43 ALA Fed 398 (1 979).
Effect of Pardon and Expungement
Rule 609(C) provides that evidence of a prior
conviction is inadmissible if the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, expungement, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a "finding of rehabillitation," provided the witness has not been convicted
of a subsequent crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year. In addition, evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, expungement, or other equivalent procedure "based on a finding of innocence."
Except for the addition of the term "expungement," the rule is identical to Federal Rule 609(C).
This addition was made because several Ohio
statutes contain expungement provisions. See RC
2953.31-36 (first offenders); RC 2151.358 Uuveniles);
Comment, Expungement in Ohio: Assimilation into
Society for Former Criminal, 8 Akron L. Rev. 480
(1975). RC 2953.32(E), however, provides that a first
offender conviction subject to expungement is
nevertheless admissible in a criminal proceeding.
As the Staff Note recognizes, the "rule conflicts
with the provision of the statute."
5
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by the circumstances of the case." /d. (syllabus,
para. 2); accord, Wroe v. State, 20 OS 460 (1870).
Scope of Cross-Examination
Rule 611(8) provides that the scope of crossexamination may encompass "all relevant matters
and matters affecting credibility." This rule is
sometimes referred to as the wide-open or English
rule. C. McCormick, Evidence 47 (2d ed. 1972).
1n contrast, Federal Rule 611 (b) adopts the American or restrictive rule on the scope of crossexamination. Under that rule, cross-examination is
"limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of
the witness."
Although it is clear that the prior Ohio cases did
not follow the restrictive view. of the scope of
cross-examination, they also did not fully endorse
the wide-open view. According to McCormick, Ohio
followed an intermediate view. See C. McCormick,
Evidence 48 n. 43 (2d ed. 1972). In Legg v. Drake, 1
OS 286 (1853), the Supreme Court expressed this
view as follows:

Juvenile Adjudications
In contrast to the federal rule, Rule 609(0) provides that evidence of juvenile adjudications offered to impeach a witness is not admissible "except as provided by statute enacted by the General
Assembly." RC 2151.358(H) governs the admissibility of juvenile adjudications. It provides, in part:
The disposition of a child under the judgment r~n-.
dered or any evidence given in court is not adm1ss1ble
as evidence against the child in any other case or proceeding in any other court, except that the judgment
rendered and the dispositon of such child may be considered by any court only as to the matter of sentence
or to the granting of probation.

The courts, however, have recognized several exceptions to the statute. See State v. Cox, 42 OS(2d)
200, 327 NE(2d) 639 (1975); State v. Marinski, 139
OS 559, 41 NE(2d) 387 (1942); State v. Hale, 21
App(2d) 207, 256 NE(2d) 239 (1969).
Pendency of Appeal
Rule 609(E) provides that the pendency of an
appeal does not affect the admissibility of a prior
conviction. Nevertheless, evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible as affecting the
weight to be accorded the prior conviction. According to the Staff Note, Rule 609(E) "is in accord
with prior Ohio law."

[A] party is not limited, in his cross-examination to the
subject matter of the examination in chief, but m~y
cross-examine [the witness] as to all matters pertment
to the issue on the trial; limited, however, by the rule,
that a party can not, before the time of opening his
own case, introduce his distinct grounds of defense
or avoidance, by the cross-examination of his adversary's witness. /d. (syllabus, para. 5).

RULE 611: MODE AND ORDER OF
INTERROGATION AND PRESENTATION
Control by the Court
Rule 611(A) provides that the trial court shall
exercise reasonable control over the conduct of
the trial including the mode and order of examining witn'esses and presenting evidence. In exercising this control, the court is to be guided by several objectives: ascertaining the truth, avoi?ing .
needless consumption of time, and protectmg Witnesses from harassment and undue embarrassment. The rule "covers such concerns as whether
testimony shall be in the form of a free narrative or
responses to specific questions, ... the order of
calling witnesses and presenting evidence, ... the
use of demonstrtive evidence, ... and the many
other questions arising during the course of a trial
which can be solved only by the judge's common
sense and fairness in view of the particular circumstances." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid.
611.
The rule is consistent with prior Ohio law. For
example, RC 2945.03 provides: "The judge ?f the
trial court shall control all proceedings dunng a
criminal trial, and shall limit the introduction of
evidence and the argument of counsel to relevant
and material matters with a view to expeditious
and effective ascertainment of the truth regarding
the matters in issue." The Ohio cases also recognized a trial court's authority to control harassing
and embarassing examinations of witnesses. In
Smith v. State, 125 OS 137, 180 NE 695 (1932), the
Supreme Court held that questioning should be.
prohibited "when a disparaging course of exammation seems unjust to the witness and uncalled for

Leading Questions
Rule 611(C) follows the traditional view of prohibiting leading questions on direct examination.
The rule, however, recognizes a number of exceptions. Leading questions are permitted when "necessary to develop [a witness'] testimony" and
when a party calls "a hostile witness, an adverse
party, or a witness identified with an adverse
.
party." The exceptions include the "witness who IS
hostile, unwilling, or biased; the child witness or
the adult with communication problems; the witness whose recollection is exhausted; and undisputed preliminary matters." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611. As the Note also recognizes this "matter clearly falls within the area of
contr~l by the judge over the mode and order of interrogation and presentation and accordingly is
phrased in words of suggestion rather than command." See also Evans v. State, 24 OS 458, 463
(1873) ("The allowing or refusing of leading questions in the examination of a witness must very
largely be subject to the control of the court, in the
exercise of sound discretion.").
An adverse party and a witness identified with
an adverse party are automatically considered
"hostile" witnesses. See Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 611 ("The final sentence deals
with categories of witnesses automatically regarded and treated as hostile.").
RULE 612: WRITING USED TO REFRESH MEMOR'

Rule 612 governs the use of writings used to
refresh a witness' recollection. A different rule gov
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erns the hearsay exception for past recollection
recorded. See Rule 803(5).
During Trial
The production and inspection of writings used
.ta by a witness to refresh recollection during trial is
''II mandatory. The language of Rule 612 making production discretionary relates only to pretrial
refreshment. The Ohio cases have recognized the
right of inspection. For example, in State v. Taylor,
83 App 76, 77 NE(2d) 279 (1947), the court held that
"by not allowing the defendant the right of inspection of the document used by the witness [to refresh recollection at trial], he was deprived of a fair
trial ... " /d. at 83. Accord, State v. Moore, 74 Ohio
LAbs 116, 139 NE(2d) 381 (CP 1956).

Rule 613 governs the foundational requirements
for the impeachment use of prior inconsistent
statements. Ohio has followed the traditional view
of admitting prior inconsistent statements only for
impeachment. Under this view, the prior statement
is offered to show the inconsistency between the
witness' trial and pretrial statements and not to
show the truth of the assertions contained in the
pretrial statement. If offered for the latter purpose,
the statement is hearsay. See McKelvey Co. v.
General Casualty Co., 166 OS 401, 405 142 N E(2d)
854, 856 (1957); State v. Duffey, 134 OS 16, 24, 15
N E(2d) 535, 539 (1 938).
The Rules of Evidence generally follow this view.
There are, however, a number of exceptions. For
example, under Rule 801(D)(i)(a) prior inconsistent
statements taken under oath, ·subject to crossexamination at the time made, and subject to penalty of perjury may be admitted as substantive evidence. Moreover, prior inconsistent statements
that qualify as admissions of a party-opponent
under Rule 801(0)(2) also are admissible as substantive evidence.
Foundational Requirements
Rule 613(A) provides that a prior written statement need not be shown to a witness as a prerequisite to an examination on that statement.
Thus the rule abolishes the requirement imposed
by Q~een Caroline's Case, 2 Brad & Bing 284, 129
Eng Rep 976 (1820). According to the Staff Note,
this "represents a departure from prior Ohio law."
See Stern & Grosh, A Visit With Queen Caroline:
Her Trial and Its Rule, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 165 (1977).
The rule does provide that the opposing counsel
has a right to inspect the statement upon request.
Rule 613(B) requires a witness be afforded an
opportunity to explain or deny a prior inconsistent
statement before extrinsic evidence of that statement is admissible. The rule follows prior Ohio
law. In King v. Wicks, 20 Ohio 87 (1851), the
Supreme Court held: "Before a witness can be
contradicted by proving statements out of Court at
variance with his testimony, he must first be inquired of, upon cross-examination, as to suc.h
statements, and the time, place and person Involved in the supposed contradiction." /d.
(syllabus). Accord. State v. Osborne, 50 OS(2d) 211,
217-18, 364 NE(2d) 216, 221 (1977), vacated on other
grounds, 438 US 91 1 (1 978).
A foundation, however, is not required if the trial
court finds that the "interests of justice" would be
defeated by imposition of the foundational requirements. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 613 provides the following explanation of this
provision: "In order to allow for such eventua~ities
as the witness becoming unavailable by the t1me
the statement is discovered a measure of discretion is conferred upon the judge."

Prior to Trial
Rule 612 provides that production of a writing
used prior to trial to refresh a witness' recollection
may be required "if the court in its discretion
determines it is necessary in the interests of justice ... " As proposed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
Federal Rule 612 did not contain this limitation;
production was mandatory. See 56 F.R.D. 276
(1973). Congre~s, howev~r, ad~ed the. provision
granting the tnal court d1scret1on. Th1s amen~r:nent
was intended as a limitation. The House Jud1c1ary
Report contains the following comment on the
amendment: "The Committee considered that permitting an adverse party to require the production
of writings used before testifying could result in
fishing expeditions among a multitude of papers
which a witness may have used in preparing for
trial." H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
7075, 7086.
Criminal Rule 16
Rule 612 contains an important exception. The
rule does not apply to writings that are governed
by Criminal Rule 16(B)(i)(g) and 16(C)(i)(d). Criminal
Rule 16(8)(1)(g) provides for the inspection and use
of prior written and recorded statements of prosecution witnesses. Such statements are subject to
an in camera inspection after the witness has testified on direct examination. If the prior statements
contain parts that are inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony, they may be used by the
defense counsel for the purpose of impeachment.
Criminal Rule 16(C)(1)(d) contains a comparable
provision governing prior statements of defense
Witnesses other than the defendant.
Criminal Rule 16 statements are limited to prior
written and recorded statements of the witness.
Consequently, if a witness refreshes his recollection with other types of documents, Criminal Rule
16 would not apply; Rule 612 would apply. Rule 612
would not appy if a witness does not refresh his
recollection with a prior written of recorded statement. Nevertheless, Rule 16 may require produc~~ tion. Finally, in contrast to Criminal Rule 16, Rule
612 does not require that the statement be inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony.

RULE 614: CALLING AND INTERROGATION
OF WITNESSES BY COURT
Calling Witnesses by the Court
Rule 614(A) recognizes the authority of the trial

RULE 613: PRIOR STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
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337 (1970).
An officer or employee of a party which is not a
natural person designated as its representative by
its attorney may not be excluded from the trial
even though that person will be called as a witness. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 615 contains the following explanation of thi"s
provision: "As the equivalent of the right of a
natural-person party to be present, a party which is
not a natural person is entitled to have a representative present. Most of the cases have involved
allowing a police officer who has been in charge
of an investigation to remain in court despite the
fact that he will be a witness ... " The Senate
Judiciary Committee construed this exception to
permit an "investigative agent" to remain during
trial notwithstanding the possibility that he may be
called as a witness. "The investigative agent's
presence may be extremely important to government counsel, especially when the case is complex or involves some specialized subject matter.
The agent, too, having lived with the case for a
long time, may be able to assist in meeting trial
surprises where the best-prepared counsel would
otherwise have difficulty." S. Rep. No. ·1277, 93d
Gong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Con g. & Ad. News 7051, 7072.
In In re United States, 584 F(2d) 666 (5th Cir
1978), the court held that the trial judge had the
authority under Federal Rule 611(a) to require the
investigative agent to testify "at an early stage of
the government's case if he remains the government's designated representative under Rule 615."
/d. at 667. A court, however, does not have the
same authority with respect to the testimony of a
criminal defendant. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
us 605 (1972).
A person whose presence is essential to the presentation of the case may not be excluded even
though that person will be called as a witness. The
party seeking the person's presence during trial
has the burden of showing that the person is
essential to the presentation of its cause. This exception "contemplates such persons as an agent
who handled the transaction being litigated or an
expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation." Advisory Committee's
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 615. See also 6 J. Wigmore,
Evidence§ 1841, at 475 n. 4 (Cadbourn rev.1976).

court to call witnesses on its own motion or at the
behest of one of the parties. This includes the
authority to call expert witnesses. The Ohio cases
have recognized the trial court's authority to call
witnesses. See State v. Adams, 62 OS(2d) 151, 404
NE(2d) 144 (1980); State v. Weind, 50 OS(2d) 224,
364 NE(2d) 224 (1977), vacated on other grounds,
438 us 911 (1978).
Interrogation by the Court
Rule 614(8) recognizes the trial court's authority
to question witnesses. The rule is consistent with
prior Ohio law. See State ex rei Wise v. Chand, 21
OS(2d) 113, 119, 256 N E(2d) 613, 617 (1970); C.A.
King & Co. v. Horton, 116 OS 205, 211, 156 NE 124,
126 (1927), dismissed, 276 US 600 (1928).
In contrast to Federal Rule 614(8), the rule specifically provides that interrogation of witnesses by
the court must be conducted "in an impartial manner." This requirement is implicit in the Federal
rule. See Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R. Evid.
614 ("The authority is, of course, abused when the
judge abandons this proper role and assumes that
of advocate ... "). The impartiality requirement is
based on prior cases. In State ex rei Wise y.
Chand, 21 OS(2d) 113, 256 NE (2d) 613 (1970), the
Supreme Court held: "In a trial before a jury, the
court's participation by questioning or comment
must be scrupulously limited, lest the court, consciously or unconsciously, indicate to the jury its
opinion on the evidence or on the credibility of a
witness." /d. (syllabus, para. 3)
RULE 615: EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES

Rule 615 governs the sequestration or exclusion
of witnesses. The rule provides that witnesses may
be excluded sua sponte by the trial judge or upon
the request of a party, in which case exclusion is
mandatory. The rule recognizes three exceptions.
A party who is a natural person may not be excluded from the trial even though that party will be
called as a witness. As the federal drafters noted,
the "[e]xclusion of persons who are parties would
raise serious problems qf confrontation and due
process." Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. R.
Evid. 615. Excluding a defendant from a criminal
trial, in the absence of a waiver, is a violation of
the right of confrontation. See Taylor v. United
States, 414 US 17 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 US
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